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Section 20 of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 deals with the 
determination and application of assessed losses in South African income 
tax. The predecessor to this section is Section 11 of the Income Tax Act, 31 
of 1941. 
Section 20 defines an assessed loss1 as any amount by which the 
deductions admissible under section 11 exceeded the income in respect of 
which they are so admissible. 
A taxpayer’s assessed loss is calculated in terms of this definition as a 
theoretical balance, which the taxpayer can set-off against its taxable income 
in the following year of assessment. 
Section 20 differentiates between the transferability of an assessed loss for a 
company and other taxpayers, where no trade was conducted or no income 
was derived from such a trade during any year of assessment, in subsection 
2A. 
Section 20 furthermore limited the application of an assessed loss calculated 
for a trade carried on outside of the Republic against any amount of income 
earned by the same taxpayer within the Republic. 
Practically, an assessed loss is formalised and communicated to a taxpayer 
on an IT34, Income Tax Assessment issued by SARS. When this assessed 
loss is applied to the calculated taxable income of the following year of 
assessment, it is included on the IT34 under the 4303 code. 
Taxpayers should always ensure that the amount calculated on the IT34 
notice is accurate. Where the taxpayer is not in agreement with the IT34, the 
taxpayer should object to SARS, specifically stating every specific ground for 
the objection. The opportunity to object prescribes after three years of the 
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original assessment and due care should be taken by taxpayers to ensure 
that all necessary action is taken within this 3 year period. 
Assessed losses have become very topical in South Africa, especially in the 
context of the current economic recession and especially in certain sectors of 
the South African economy for example property development, asset 
intensive manufacturing concerns and the agricultural sector. 
Section 20 practically preserves the expenses taxpayers incurred and 
deducted in terms of section 11 of the ITA in previous years of assessment 
where these expenses exceeded the income and grant these expenses as 
deductions against income in years of assessment subsequent to the years 
in which these expenses were actually incurred. 
The challenge for all taxpayers lies in the arrangement of their affairs in such 
a way as to not lose their balance of assessed loss, whilst possibly 
restructuring and adjusting their businesses in a cost effective way 

















Summary of the context of the dissertation 
This content of this paper is focused on and divided into the following 
sections: 
o The wording of Section 20 (Previously section 11 of the 1941 Act) of 
the Income Tax Act No 58 of 1962 and other relevant legislation. 
o A discussion of applicable case law: 
• CIR vs Loius Zinn Organisation (Pty) Ltd 1958 (4) SA 477 (A) 22 
SATC 85 (“Louis Zinn”) 
• CIR vs Datakor Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1998 (4) SA 1050 (SCA) 60 
SATC 503 (“Datakor”) 
• Conshu (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1994 (4) SA 603 (A) 57 SATC 1 
(“Conshu”) 
• ITC 1830 70 SATC 123 2008 (“ITC 1830”) 
• CSARS v Megs Investments (Pty) Ltd & Another 2005 (4) SA 328 
(SCA) 66 SATC 175 (“Megs Investments”) 
















The wording of Section 20 of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 
1962 and other relevant documentation 
The wording of Section 20 of the ITA, Set-off of assessed losses reads as 
follows: 
 
1) For the purpose of determining the taxable income derived by any person 
from carrying on any trade, there shall, subject to section 20A, be set off 
against the income so derived by such person-- 
a) any balance of assessed loss incurred by the taxpayer in any 
previous year which has been carried forward from the preceding year 
of assessment: 
Provided that-- [deleted by the Taxation Laws Amendment 
Act, 2012 (Act No. 22 of 2012)] 
i)[deleted by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 2012 (Act 
No. 22 of 2012)] 
ii)[deleted by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 2012 (Act 
No. 22 of 2012)] 
iii)[deleted by s.17 of Act No. 21 of 1995]; 
 
b) any assessed loss incurred by the taxpayer during the same year of 
assessment in carrying on any other trade either alone or in partnership 
with others, otherwise than as a member of a company the capital 
whereof is divided into shares: 
Provided that there shall not be set off against any amount  
a) distributed to such person by any pension fund or provident 
fund which is included in the gross income of such person in 
terms of paragraph (eB) of the definition of 'gross income' in 
section 1, any— 





ii) 'assessed loss' as defined in subsection (2) incurred 
in such year before taking into account any amount of 
such distribution;  
b) derived by any person from the carrying on within the 
Republic of any trade, any— 
i) assessed loss incurred by such person during such 
year; or 
ii) any balance of assessed loss incurred in any previous 
year of assessment, In carrying on any trade outside the 
Republic; or 
c)that is a retirement fund lump sum benefit or retirement fund 
lump sum withdrawal benefit included in taxable income, any— 
i) balance of assessed loss; 
ii) ‘assessed loss’ as defined in subsection (2) incurred in such 
year before taking into account that retirement fund lump sum 
benefit or retirement fund lump sum withdrawal benefit. 
  
2)For the purposes of this section ‘assessed loss’ means any amount by 
which the deductions admissible under section 11 exceeded the income in 




2A)In the case of any taxpayer other than a company-- 
a) the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) shall mutatis mutandis 
apply for the purpose of determining the taxable income derived by 
such taxpayer otherwise than from carrying on any trade, the 
reference in subsection (1) to "taxable income derived by any person 
from carrying on any trade" and the reference in that subsection to 
"the income so derived" being respectively construed as including a 
reference to taxable income derived by the taxpayer otherwise than 
from carrying on any trade and a reference to income so derived; and 
b)the said taxpayer shall, subject to the provisos to subsection (1), not 





by reason of the fact that he has not derived any income during any 
year of assessment. 
The proviso previously included in subparagraph (a) to section (1) read as 
follows before it was deleted with the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 22 
of 2012: 
Provided that- 
i.) no person whose estate has been voluntarily of compulsorily 
sequestrated shall be entitled to carry forward any assessed 
loss incurred prior to the date of sequestration, unless the 
order of sequestration has been set aside, in which case the 
amount to be so carried forward shall be reduced by an 
amount which was allowed to be set off against the income 
of the insolvent estate of such person from the carrying on of 
any trade; and 
ii.) the balance of assessed loss shall be reduced by the 
amount or value of any benefit received by or accruing to a 
person resulting from a concession granted by or a 
compromise made with any creditor of such person whereby 
any liability owed by such person to such creditor has been 
reduced or extinguished, to the extent that –  
(aa) the amount advance by such was used, directly or 
indirectly, to fund expenditure or an asset; and 
(bb) a deduction was allowed in terms of section 11, in 
respect of such expenditure or asset;   
The second proviso is discussed in detail in the Louis Zinn case below, and 
therefore the need to include this proviso specifically under this heading. 
Please note that the Tax Law Amendment Act No 22 of 2012 replaced this 








The wording of section 7(5) of the ITA reads as follows:  
 
5)If any person has made any donation, settlement or other disposition which 
is subject to a stipulation or condition, whether made or imposed by such 
person or anybody else, to the effect that the beneficiaries thereof or some of 
them shall not receive the income or some portion of the income thereunder 
until the happening of some event, whether fixed or contingent, so much of 
any income as would, but for such stipulation or condition, in consequence of 
the donation, settlement or other disposition be received by or accrue to or in 
favour of the beneficiaries, shall, until the happening of that event or the 
death of that person, whichever first takes place, be deemed to be the 
income of that person. 
 
The wording of section 103(2) of the ITA reads as follows:  
2)Whenever the Commissioner is satisfied that-- 
a)any agreement affecting any company or trust; or 
b)any change in-- 
i)the shareholding in any company; or  
ii)the members' interests in any company which is  close 
corporation; or 
iii)the trustees or beneficiaries of any trust, 
as a direct or indirect result of which 
A)income has been received by or has accrued to that 
company or trust during any year of assessment, or 
B)any proceeds received by or accrued to or deemed to 
have been received by or to have accrued to that company 
or trust in consequence of the disposal of any asset, as 
contemplated in the Eighth Schedule, result in a capital gain 
during any year of assessment, 
has at any time been entered into or effected by any person solely or mainly 





any capital loss or any assessed capital loss, as the case may be, incurred 
by the company or trust, in order to avoid liability on the part of that company 
or trust or any other person for the payment of any tax, duty or levy on 
income, or to reduce the amount thereof – 
aa)the set-off of any such assessed loss or balance of 
assessed loss against any such income shall be 
disallowed, 
bb)the set-off of any such assessed loss or balance of 
assessed loss against any taxable capital gain, to the 
extent that such taxable capital gain takes into account 
such capital gain, shall be disallowed; or 
cc)the set off of such capital loss or assessed capital 
loss against such capital gain shall be disallowed. 
 
 
The wording of paragraph 71 of the 8th Schedule of the ITA reads as follows:  
71)Attribution of capital gain subject to revocable vesting 
Where— 
a)a deed of donation, settlement or other disposition confers a right 
upon a beneficiary thereof who is a resident to receive a capital gain 
attributable to that donation, settlement or other disposition or any 
portion of that gain;  
b)that right may be revoked or conferred upon another by the person who 
conferred it; and 
c)a capital gain attributable to that donation, settlement or other disposition 
or a portion of that gain has in terms of that right vested in that beneficiary 
during a year of assessment throughout which the person who conferred that 
right has been a resident and has retained the power to revoke that right,  
that capital gain or that portion thereof must be disregarded when 
determining the aggregate capital gain or aggregate capital loss of that 
beneficiary and be taken into account when determining the aggregate 







CIR v Louis Zinn Organisation (Pty) Ltd 1958 (4) SA 477 (A) 
22 SATC 852 
The Louis Zinn court case focuses on the difference between the wording of 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of section 20 of the ITA, read 
together with the provisos to these subparagraphs, specifically the proviso 
the subparagraph (a). This proviso has now been deleted with effect from 1 
January 2013 and is now dealt with in section 19 of the ITA, Reduction of 
debt, of the ITA. Please note that the Louis Zinn case deals with years of 
assessment before 1962 and the equivalent of section 20 in the current ITA 
is section 11 in Act No 31 of 1941. 
Background and pertinent facts of the case 
Louis Zinn, a company that conducted his trade as a clothing manufacturer, 
incurred a loss in its 1954 year of assessment. During the same period of 
assessment, the company disclosed a compromise with its creditors in the 
annual financial statements and the Commissioner applied section 
11(3)(a)(ii) and reduced the assessed loss calculated for the 1954 year of 
assessment by the amount of the compromise with creditors as disclosed by 
Louis Zinn.  
Louis Zinn contended that the application of both sections 11(4)(a) and 
11(3)(a)(ii) had no application where the trading loss, which created the 
assessed loss to be carried forward (as opposed to the balance of assessed 
loss carried forward from the previous year) and the compromise with 
creditors come into existence in the same year of assessment. 
No other matters, for example the capital or revenue nature of the loss or the 
trade requirement were ever under dispute in this case. 
Louis Zinn’s objection was disallowed by the Commissioner and the 
company appealed to the special court. The Special Court upheld their 
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appeal on the basis that only a balance of assessed loss carried forward 
from the preceding year of assessment can be adjusted in terms of section 
11(3)(a)(ii), using a very narrow and strict application of this phrase. 
The Commissioner appealed to the Appellate Division and Schreiner ACJ 
presiding for the full bench, allowed the Commissioner’s appeal on the 
grounds that the adjustment to the balance of the assessed loss takes place 
at the stage where this balance is determined, in other word as part of the 
assessment which creates balance of assessed loss to be carried forward 
and set off against taxable income in future years of assessment. 
Discussion   
The critical element of this case was the use of the phrase ‘balance of 
assessed loss’ in subparagraph 11(3)(a)(ii), (Section 20(1)(a) of the 1962 
Act). 
The word balance3 read in the specific context of the phrase ‘balance of 
assessed loss’ included in Section 11 of the Income Tax Act of 1941, (and 
Section 20 of the ITA) implies an amount that was previously determined and 
created after being subject to adjustments and now carried forward from the 
preceding year of assessment. 
The anomaly4 created by the wording of this section of the Act is clearly 
illustrated by the arguments put forward by both the counsel for the appellant 
and the respondent. The appellant’s counsel used section 11(4)(a) as the 
basis for adjusting the current years trading loss and therefore the balance of 
assessed loss carried forward to following year of assessment. The counsel 
for the respondent argued that there was no balance of assessed loss 
carried forward from previous years and that therefore section 11(3)(a)(i) did 
not apply. Clearly, these two arguments were not in conflict. The real conflict 
lies within the grounds of the objection of the taxpayer and the ruling of the 
Special Court where it was decided to use the limited operation of section 
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11(3)(a)(i) in the evaluation as to whether section 11(4)(a) should be applied 
under the circumstances. Section 11(3)(a)(i) was clearly a limitation to future 
adjustments to assessed losses imposed by the legislator only where a 
balance of assessed loss existed and was carried forward. This section 
should however not limit the application of section 11(4)(a) when determining 
taxable income for a specific year of assessment. The inclusion of the word 
balance in section 11(3)(a)(i) would imply that the evaluation of a possible 
reduction of an assessed loss happens after the determination of taxable 
income and only evaluates the residual value of the assessed loss at any 
point in time. 
This is in conflict with Schreiner ACJ’s verdict in the Louis Zinn case. 
Schreiner ACJ concluded that the possible reduction of an assessed loss as 
contemplated in section 11(3)(a)(ii) takes place at the determination stage of 
such a balance of assessed loss and not the application stage. By taking this 
view, Schreiner ACJ effectively rendered the distinction between a balance 
of assessed loss and an assessed loss redundant.  
The opposing view that a balance of assessed loss must be interpreted in a 
distinctly different way to an assessed loss is supported by the simple reality 
that the legislator saw the need to clearly distinguish between these two 
phrases in the construction of the different subparagraphs of section 11(3) 
(and section 20(1) as it exists today) and that the limitation in section 
11(3)(a)(ii) only applies to subparagraph (a). 
Schreiner’s view therefore appears to be in conflict with the accepted 
interpretation of the words balance of assessed loss5.  
Conclusion and discussion of possible implications 
With all due respect, it seems like Schreiner ACJ interpreted the words of the 
Act in a way to achieve a predetermined outcome. The fact that the Appellate 
Division (now the SCA) is limited to evaluate the merit of the decision 
reached in the lower courts and the fact that a different ground of appeal was 
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not introduced at the Appellate Division might have prompted him to argue in 
such a way.  
A different way in which a judge in the Appellate Division could have come to 
the conclusion that the compromise Louis Zinn reached with its creditors 
justified a reduction in taxable income of the year of assessment in 1954, 
would have been to apply section 11(4)(a) in isolation even though section 
11(3)(a)(ii) had no application in this instance. It does however appear that 
counsel for the appellant erred in their grounds of appeal to the Special Court 
and this forced Schreiner ACJ to follow the above interpretation in order 
achieve a result which most accepted as being equitable and not in conflict 
with the contra fiscum6 rules. 
The anomaly created in this case, which still exist today is the fact that even 
though the word balance of assessed loss is included in Section 20(1)(a), it 
appears to have become irrelevant in the light of the above verdict, 
especially due to the principle hereby established that an assessed loss can 
be adjusted at the determination stage. This is clearly a deviation of what is 
expected and normal and the Act could be easily be misinterpreted by 
someone not fully aware of Schreiner ACJ’s verdict in 1958. 
Please note that since the introduction of section 19, Reduction of debt, of 
the ITA, effective from 1 January 2013, read in combination with section 
8(4)(a), the effect the anomaly created in the Louis Zinn case have been 
mitigated and addressed to a certain extent where the possible adjustment to 
the balance of assessed loss was due a reduction of debt. The distinction 
between a balance of assessed loss as used in section 20(1)(a) and 
assessed loss as used in section 20(1)(b) still remains in the current 
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CIR vs Datakor Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1998 (4) SA 1050 (SCA) 
60 SATC 5037 
The Datakor case deals with the amount or value of any benefit that serves 
as a reduction in assessed losses in terms of section 20(1)(a)(ii) (as it then 
existed) and the difference between the benefit received or conceded by the 
creditor as opposed to the benefit received by the debtor with an assessed 
loss, being Datakor in this instance. 
Background and pertinent facts 
Datakor was declared commercially insolvent in 1989 and was put into final 
liquidation. In terms of a scheme of arrangement in terms of section 311 of 
the Companies Act of South Africa8, entered into between Datakor, its 
shareholders and its secured and unsecured creditors, Datakor become a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Datakor Ltd (‘holding company’) and funds 
received from the holding company were used to settle commercial debts, 
including a pro rata payment to concurrent creditors. The unpaid portions of 
the concurrent claims were to be capitalised by the taxpayer to redeemable 
preference share capital, including a premium portion. As part of this 
agreement, these preference shares were to be renounced by the creditors 
to the holding company.  
The Commissioner applied section 20(1)(a)(ii) to reduce the taxpayer’s 
assessed loss by the amount capitalised to the share premium account. The 
taxpayer objected and this objection was disallowed by the Commissioner. 
The taxpayer’s appeal to the Special Court was upheld on the basis that the 
onus of establishing the amount or value of the benefit to the taxpayer was 
on the Commissioner. 
The full bench of the SCA, with Harms JA presiding, concurred that there 
indeed was a benefit for the taxpayer in such an agreement and that section 
20(1)(a)(ii) did apply. The SCA also overturned the decision of the Special 
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Court where it was previously decided that the onus of establishing the 
amount or value of the benefit was on the Commissioner, and thereby upheld 
the Commissioner’s appeal.  
Discussion 
In the light of the above situation and facts, it is important to firstly evaluate 
whether section 20(1)(a)(ii) is indeed applicable.  
The element of this section over which the most doubt could possibly exist is 
whether the benefit was indeed resulting from a concession granted or a 
compromise made with his creditors. This clearly indicates that the legislator 
intended a very narrow application of section 20(1)(a)(ii). It limits the required 
evaluation to the relationship between the taxpayer and its own trading 
creditors only. In this instance the taxpayer’s trade creditors gave up their 
right to claim payment of the residual value of their claims, in exchange for 
redeemable preference shares. This type of share is an instrument which will 
only burden the taxpayer to make a payment where the taxpayer is in a 
position to do so. The holder of such an instrument is not in a position to 
claim any payment up until the point where the majority of the shareholders 
are in agreement to a dividend declaration or share buy-back, only after such 
an action was proposed to all shareholders by the taxpayer’s directors who in 
turn are responsible for the overseeing that the company meets the 
necessary solvency and liquidity requirements as required by the Companies 
Act. The rights these concurrent creditors received in return for the right to 
claim payment for the residual balance of their claims, bore the 
characteristics of equity shareholders, and therefore the exchange of asset 
by them should be regarded as a concession from their side. They have in 
effect accepted a ranking lower in the payment pecking order than what they 
had previously. The fact that these preference shares could possibly provide 
a greater return than a once off claim in the event where the company 
becomes profitable, does not detract from the fact a concession was made 





Please note that the creditors’ arrangement with the holding company to 
renounce these shares should not be brought into contention due to the 
required narrow application of the wording of the section. 
The second element of section 20(1)(a)(ii) that should be evaluated is 
whether any benefit9 accrued to the taxpayer Datakor. This element of the 
section requires a very wide application, by virtue of the inclusion of the word 
any. In evaluating the financial position of Datakor in isolation, before and 
after the arrangement with its secured and unsecured creditors, there could 
be little doubt that any benefit accrued to them. They would have gone from 
commercial insolvency, to not only being solvent but also having support 
from a new holding company.  
The amount or value of such a benefit accruing to Datakor is the last element 
necessary to qualify for an adjustment to the balance of assessed loss in 
terms of section 20(1)(a)(ii). As with the definition of gross income, the words 
amount or value should be interpreted in the same way as described by 
Watermeyer J in the court case Lategan v CIR10. He described these words 
to have a wider application than only money, but all form of property, whether 
corporeal or incorporeal, which has a monetary value.   
The real challenge in this case would be to prove the actual monetary value 
of the accrued benefit to Datakor, which could be a very subjective and 
complicated calculation. In the Datakor case the SCA chose to not use the 
authority of Butcher Brothers (Pty) Ltd, CIR v (1945 AD)11 in order to 
establish the value of the accrued benefit. The SCA avoided dealing with the 
valuation matter by using the grounds of the original taxpayer’s objection, or 
the lack of including the valuation matter specifically in his grounds of 
objection, and to use the amount argued by the Commissioner as the 
amount or value of the benefit by default. The Commissioner argued that the 
accounting entry to increase the share premium account was the fixed 
amount of the accrued benefit. It remains debatable whether this amount 
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constitutes the true amount or value of the accrued benefit. This would 
probably have been an accurate estimate of the accrued benefit in the 
instance where there were no shares or other instruments issued by Datakor 
in exchange for these claims. Datakor did however issue redeemable 
preference shares to these concurrent creditors, but the full bench of the 
SCA did not include this fact in their verdict. 
Conclusion and discussion of possible implications 
No doubt exists as to the fact that there indeed was an accrued benefit to 
Datakor. The anomaly created with the Datakor case has two elements. 
Firstly, that no consideration was given to the fact that redeemable 
preference shares, with current and future cost implications to the taxpayer, 
were issued by Datakor to its concurrent creditors and secondly on a 
technical decision, by not including the valuation matter in the taxpayer’s 
original objection, the crux of this case, the valuation of the accrued benefit, 
was avoided and dismissed with a clearly inequitable result as a 
consequence. 
It could be argued that by practical operation of the assessment process, the 
Commissioner accepted the onus of proving the amount or value of the 
benefit by proposing a Rand value to the adjustment to the assessed loss. 
But even if the onus was on the taxpayer to prove the amount or value of the 
benefit accrued, by dismissing the verdict of the lower court, without 
addressing the valuation matter, the SCA did not fulfill its obligation to deal 
with the valuation matter as a natural consequence of the judicial order of 
event in this case. 
A better approach would have been for the SCA to order the taxpayer to get 
a valuation of the redeemable preference shares done by a sworn 
independent valuator and use this as a reduction in the face value the 
amount of outstanding claims capitalised to share premium in order to 
establish the accrued benefit to Datakor. This approach would be appropriate 
where there is a definite cost to the taxpayer in order for him to be relieved of 





Another solution could be for the Act to be amended to give guidance as to 
how these benefits should be valued. Alternatively, the view of the special 
court should not be ignored and that the use of precedent set in Butcher 
Brothers (Pty) Ltd, CIR v (1945 AD) should be used to determine such an 
amount. 
Please note that section 19 of the Income Tax Act no 58 of 1963 was 
introduced effectively from 1 January 2013, together with the removal of 
section 20(1)(a)(ii). The application of section 19 would not have been 
different to that of section 20(1)(a)(ii), except for the fact that it specifically 
defined to “reduction amount” to include costs or consideration applied for 
such a reduction. Furthermore, this section is specifically read with section 
8(4)(a) and to the extent that the reduction amount exceeds the balance of 
the assessed loss, this residual amount will be included in taxable income in 
terms of section 8(4)(a). 
The anomaly that remains in current legislation is that SCA is in the power to 
avoid the crux of a legal matter based on the fact that this was not included 
in the taxpayer’s original notice of objection. This can give rise to inequitable 
results in the SCA where matters which are generally accepted to be part of 
the context of important arguments submitted, but are not formally 
documented in the taxpayer’s objection or its appeal to the Tax Court and 
therefore not considered. Taxpayers should take due care to formalise all 
matters, not only the argument which addresses the principle which the 











Conshu (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1994 (4) SA 603 (A) 57 SATC 112 
This case deals with the practical application of section 20(1) of the ITA, 
when it is found that an agreement entered into by the shareholders of the 
company falls within the ambit of section 103(2).  
Background and pertinent facts 
Conshu had a balance of assessed loss for the year ended 1984 of 
approximately R 5,900,000 and this loss increased to approximately R 
9,900,000 at the end of the 1985. On the last day of the 1985 year of 
assessment Conshu’s shareholders at the time entered into an agreement 
which clearly fell into the ambit of section 103(2). As a result of this 
agreement, Conshu earned substantial taxable income in the 1986 year of 
assessment and the Commissioner disallowed the set off of the balance of 
assessed loss against the tainted taxable income for the 1986 year of 
assessment. 
Conshu objected to the Commissioner against these assessments but after 
this objection being disallowed, not only appealed to the Special Court but 
applied for leave to introduce further grounds of objection. All grounds of 
appeal to the Special Court was dismissed and Conshu appealed to the 
Appellate Division, only to clarify the matter as to whether the Commissioner 
can apply the provisions of section 103(2) for the first time in a subsequent 
year of assessment to the year when this agreement falling into the ambit of 
this section was concluded. 
The full bench of the Appellate Division, in a split decision with Harms JA 
presiding for the majority, ruled against Conshu and determined that the 
Commissioner was within his rights to only apply section 103(2) for the first 
time in subsequent years and the appeal was dismissed. 
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Due to the fact that this was a split decision, especially 3 judges versus 2 
judges, it is important to evaluate the provisions of sections 20(1) and 103(2) 
closely, before applying these two sections to the context of the case. 
Section 103(2) permits the Commissioner to disallow the set-off of assessed 
losses or the balance of assessed losses in the certain specific 
circumstances where a change of shareholding has taken place in terms of 
an agreement between shareholders (ignoring the use of close corporations 
and trusts for this argument), and as a direct or indirect result of this 
agreement income or a capital gain accrues to the taxpayer.  
The conflict within the interpretation of section 103(2) is created by the wide 
application of the phrases ‘balance of assessed loss’ or ‘assessed loss’ by 
adding the word ‘any’ to section 103(2)(b)(B)(aa) and section 
103(2)(b)(B)(bb). This stands in contrast, even if this is not always very 
apparent, with the nature and the construction of a balance of assessed loss 
or assessed loss as defined and introduced into the legislation in section 20.   
It was held by EM Grosskopf JA, presiding for the minority judgement in the 
Conshu case, that an assessed loss had a notional existence for a single 
year of assessment only.  This implies that a new assessed loss comes into 
existence every year.  
This interpretation by EM Grosskopf JA creates conflict with the wording of 
section 103(2) and the opportunity for different views, where the set-off of 
any assessed loss is disallowed. This section also includes the words at any 
time earlier in the same subparagraph when referring to the agreement 
subject matter of this section, which clearly indicates that the legislator 
designed this section to have a very wide scope.  
However, the word any is followed by the word such13 in both 
subparagraphs (aa) and (bb). The inclusion of the word such narrows the 
scope of these limiting subparagraphs to assessed losses utilised in the set-
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off against tainted income or capital gain created by virtue of the agreement 
to change the shareholding. The word such in this context would determine 
the outline of the scope of such a subparagraph with the word any making all 
items included in this determined scope applicable.  
The critical question in this case is whether the words any such would 
include any new assessed loss, created in subsequent years and whether 
the timing of the conclusion of the agreement that creates the tainted income 
or capital gain can limit the assessed loss set-off in future years.  
Applying this to the Conshu case, the only assessed loss or balance of 
assessed loss in existence at the time of the conclusion of the agreement to 
change shareholding, was the assessed loss brought forward from the 1984 
year of assessment. The trading losses incurred in the 1985 year of 
assessment might well have been known to the parties to the agreement, but 
did not fit the definition of either a balance of assessed loss or an assessed 
loss as contemplated by section 103(2).  
Harms JA, presiding for the majority in this case followed quite a robust 
approach in not evaluating the limitation set by section 103(2) having its 
existence in the word such, to the specific assessed losses applicable under 
this section and found in favour of the Commissioner. 
Furthermore, Harms JA tried to use a different definition for the term 
“income” as included in section 20 than the definition specifically included in 
the definitions included in section 1 of the ITA. This revised definition seems 
to be the court’s effort to limit the existence of an assessed loss to one year 
only and to never accumulate, which in not in line with common sense, 
previous case law or the Commissioners practice14. 
Conclusion and discussion of possible implications  
In every split decision by the SCA, there is a need to have a much closer 
look at the facts of the case, the context and position of the both parties’ view 
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and the state of the legislation and case law which was in existence at the 
time of the decision. 
In this instance, my view is that the legislation and the case law was in a 
state were the taxpayer Conshu put forward a very good and well prepared 
case in order to prove that they did not fall foul of section 103(2) to the extent 
the counsel for the Commissioner contended, on a technical basis, the 
argument being that the Commissioner was entitled to only apply section 
103(2) to the balance of assessed loss or assessed loss that existed at the 
time of concluding the agreement.  
One can only speculate, but that possibly could be the reason why the 
agreement was indeed concluded on the last day of the 1985 year of 
assessment as opposed to the first day of the 1986 year of assessment. This 
could have been done based on professional advice at the time.  
The uncertainty and reason for the split decision in my view is because of the 
lack of clarity in the drafting of section 103(2). This section is not particularly 
clear as to which assessed loss, in other words, the assessed loss existing at 
what point in time is being ‘ring fenced15’ in terms of this section and perhaps 
needs clarification. This is after accepting the words of EM Grosskopf JA that 
any assessed loss has a notional existence for a single year of assessment 
only, by the construction of any particular assessed loss in terms of section 
20. 
The approach followed by Harms JA seems to be an overly robust approach, 
where he not only tried to use a different definition of income than the 
definition formalised and included in section 1 of the ITA but also dismissed 
the principle that an assessed loss has a limited life as determined by section 
20. This was probably done in his efforts to come to a fair and equitable 
result based on his view of the intention of the legislator. I would tend to 
agree that section 103(2) was never drafted with the intention that the 
manipulation of the timing of the conclusion of such an agreement could 
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allow taxpayers to circumvent or limit the effect of the provisions of section 
103(2). 
But on the other hand, judges, especially judges in the SCA, are obliged to 
interpret the legislation in its current form and cannot try and anticipate the 
intention of the legislators. Tax avoidance is not prohibited by the ITA or any 
other Act in South Africa, and in this case it seems like legitimate tax 

























ITC 1830 70 SATC 123 2008 
This Tax Court case involves a taxpayer, not being a taxpayer other than a 
company as defined in section 20(2A)(b), who wanted to carry forward an 
assessed loss to a year in which it derived no income from trade. 
Discussion 
The provisions of section 20(2A) was inserted into the ITA during 1973. It 
would seem that due to the fact that this section only applies to taxpayers 
other than a company as defined in the act, by implication, the opposite 
would apply to taxpayers who are indeed companies.  However, the ITA is 
not clear about the position of companies and the Commissioner’s practical 
application, as seen in this case, is a narrow one. 
During 2010 the Commissioner issued Interpretation Note No 33 (issue 2) in 
order to document SARS’s view on both the ‘trade’ and ‘income from trade’ 
requirements embodied in the provisions of section 20. SARS have 
recognised that the narrow application of either of these two requirements 
could possibly have some unintended results and have indicated that they 
will not follow the precedent set in ITC 1830. In the case of companies, each 
case will be decided on its own merit and where a company do not earn 
income from his trade, they will be burdened with the onus to prove trading 
activities during the year of assessment and the extent of their trading 
activities could be decisive as to whether they are allowed to carry forward a 
balance of assessed loss to a year of assessment where they have received 
no income from trading activities. 
The IN 33 is by no means law and the SCA are obliged to comply with the 
stare decisis16 principle and to follow previous court cases which have set 
the precedent in the past. No clear precedent currently exists in the South 
African case law in terms of the income from trade requirement, and hence 
the need for IN 33 was identified by SARS in 2010. The SCA would however 
not be bound by a decision of the Tax Court for example ITC 1830.  
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Conclusion and discussion of possible implications  
The anomaly and confusion that is embodied in our current legislation and 
case law is not so much linked to the definition or application of the trade or 
income from trade requirement but rather with the possible relief from 
SARS’s narrow application of the these terms, by virtue of IN 33, when 
deciding on whether or not an assessed loss can be carried forward to a 
subsequent year of assessment. 
One can’t help but feel that taxpayers should be advised to still arrange their 
tax affairs in a way that does not require them to rely on IN 33. The fact that 
this relief is not incorporated into the ITA makes it insufficient and 
troublesome. 
To illustrate the conundrum such a taxpayer could possibly face, I sketch the 
following scenario: A company taxpayer who operates as a developer of 
residential property units, arrive at the stage in a project where the property 
units are completed, and the ones which were not previously sold, go up for 
sale. During this time and as it happened in 2008, the property market 
collapses and these property units are impossible to sell at an acceptable 
profit margin. At the end of the year of assessment when these units became 
impossible to sell, the company is obliged to write down its closing stock, 
representing unsold property units, to the net realisable value and recognises 
a loss for income tax purposes. The taxpayer then prepares itself for a tough 
time because the property market is not expected to recover sufficiently 
within the next 5 years and needs to make a decision as to pursue one of the 
following options. Firstly, it can decide to rent out these units in the 
meantime, earn rental income and mitigate the running costs of the units up 
until the point where the market recovers, and in this way earn income from a 
trade and keep the assessed loss alive. Leasing is specifically included in the 
definition of trade17 in section 1 of the ITA. This option has a VAT risk 
attached to it, in terms of section 18(1) of the VAT Act No 89 of 1991, where 
the Commissioner can make a possible output VAT adjustment if it is found 
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that the taxpayer has then applied these units wholly for a purpose other 
than making taxable supplies. Secondly, the taxpayer can choose to just 
maintain these units, without entering lease agreements with tenants and 
without earning rental income. This second option involves the risk of the 
taxpayer not being able to carry forward and set-off the assessed loss 
created when the stock was written down to its net realisable value in 
subsequent tax years in order to utilise this assessed loss when the property 
market recovers and the units are sold at an acceptable margin. 
The above scenario illustrates the possible unintended results, where a fatal 
interruption in the income from trade requirement takes place with no 
intention of the taxpayer to cease trading, as referred to by IN 33. In order for 
this relief, as envisaged by the designers of this Interpretation Note, to have 
a real effect on any commercial decision a taxpayer needs to make from time 
to time, this proposed wider application of the income from trade 
requirement for company taxpayers needs a formal introduction into the 














CSARS v Megs Investments (Pty) Ltd & Another 2005 (4) SA 
328 (SCA) 66 SATC 17518 
This case dealt with the issue of whether company taxpayers’ balance of 
assessed loss could be set-off against non-trading investment income 
earned by the same taxpayers. 
Background and pertinent facts 
The taxpayers traded as agents for various retail supermarket outlets on the 
procurement side. Their activities involved negotiations with suppliers on 
behalf of the retail outlets, in order to obtain volume rebates and also 
included the back office management of the procurement cycle on behalf of 
its customers, including accounting for, reconciliation of and settlement of 
suppliers’ accounts. 
In 1996, the taxpayers sold their businesses to Shoprite Checkers and in the 
period when the funds for the purchase price were suspended in a trust bank 
account, earned interest together with further interest on an investment after 
the funds were released and placed at a financial institution in the short term. 
The taxpayers continued trading during 1996, by ways of pursuing similar 
opportunities in other African countries including Namibia and Angola as well 
as looking to exploit their wholesale liquor and firearm licences which were 
not included in the sale transaction but did not earn any income from this 
trade. 
Only interest income was earned in the 1996 year of assessment and the 
taxpayers were looking to set-off their balances of assessed loss against the 
interest income earned.  
The Commissioner disallowed this in terms of section 20(1) and the 
taxpayers appealed successfully to the tax court. The Commissioners appeal 
to the Orange Free State Provincial Division was unsuccessful and appealed 
to the SCA. 
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Jonas AJA held that section 20(1) did not permit the set-off of a balance of 
assessed loss against income from non-trading activities, for example 
earning income from investments and therefore upheld the Commissioners 
appeal. 
Discussion 
In order to evaluate whether the taxpayers were rightfully not allowed to 
apply the provisions of section 20(1), one has to carefully analyse the 
wording of section 20(1). This section is constructed with two primary 
requirements being firstly, the trade requirement embodied in the phrase 
‘from carrying on any trade’ and secondly, the income from trade 
requirement embodied in the phrase ‘be set off against the income so 
derived’. There is a crucial link between these two requirements by virtue of 
the legislator using the word so in the second phrase.  
On this basis the court found in the negative that the balance of assessed 
loss carried forward from 1995 could not be set-off against the investment 
income. This serves as further precedent that the earning of passive 
investment income like interest is not included in the definition of trade as 
defined in section 1 of the ITA.  
This finding was in a similar theme to judgements relating to irrecoverable 
loans, for example in the court case of Burman v CIR19, where Goldstone JA 
held that a taxpayer who did not lend money as their main business activity 
could not argue that a loan made ancillary to its main line of business could 
be interpreted as part of its trading activities and could therefore not be of a 
revenue nature.   
Important to note is that the SCA were not asked to decide whether set-off is 
indeed permissible where a trade was conducted in the particular year of 
assessment but that no income was derived from that specific trade. This 
matter was also left undecided in SA Bazaars (Pty) Ltd V CIR20 (‘SA 
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Bazaars’) and Robin Consolidated Industries Ltd V CIR21 (‘Robin 
Consolidated’).  
Conclusion and discussion of possible implications  
One can’t help but feel that the reluctance of the SCA to give a verdict on the 
matter as to whether the income from trade requirement is critically 
necessary in order for section 20 to apply is due to the fact that not in any of 
the Megs Investments, SA Bazaars or Robin Consolidated cases this court 
was required to do so. In two of the three of the cases, the taxpayers did not 
succeed in proving the presence of trading activities and therefore did not 
succeed in proving the trade requirement in section 20. 
Interestingly in the case of Megs Investments, trading activities were clearly 
present. The reason why the SCA did not have to give a verdict on the above 
matter in this instance lies in the construction of the taxpayers’ objection to 
Commissioners assessment and the arguments submitted by counsel for the 
taxpayers in the Tax Court. The fact that counsel for the taxpayer did not 
submit an argument to say that immediate income from trading activities was 
not necessary in order for section 20 to apply, constituted a concession that 
the drafting of the wording of section 20 was perhaps too narrow and that 
this argument was out of the question. They clearly felt that their only chance 
to succeed in this case was to prove that the taxpayers have changed their 
primary trading activities upon selling its business to an investment company 
with interest as its trading income.  
This concession made by counsel for the taxpayer however is in contrast 
with the subsequent action taken by SARS to issue IN 33. In IN 33, SARS 
concede that the narrow wording and the strict application of section both 
requirements of section 20 may have some unintended or undesired results.  
Such possible unintended results can be illustrated in the Megs Investments 
court case. The taxpayers made the decision to sell the majority, but not all 
of its assets. The proceeds on the sale of these assets typically would not be 
available immediately at the disposal of the taxpayers upon the conclusion of 
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such an agreement. These funds would normally be held in trust for the 
duration of the period within which all the suspensive conditions included in 
the contract are being fulfilled, for example a due diligence process, 
Competition Commissioners approval and other negotiated conditions. This 
process could be a lengthy one which could have the duration of more than 
one financial year. Inevitably, taxpayers entering into an agreement to sell 
the majority of its assets would therefore earn interest on the proceeds held 
in trust for such a period. One can understand that the unfortunate result, 
where a business is sold lock, stock and barrel, would be that the company 
taxpayer would lose his balance of assessed loss in the year of assessment 
subsequent to selling the business and any interest earned in such a period 
would be taxable without such a trading assessed loss shield. In the case of 
Megs Investments however, this unfortunate result should not have come 
into play. This is due to the fact that Megs Investments clearly carried on 
trading. The mere fact that no income from these specific trading activities 
where earned in the first year of assessment, should not have disrupted the 
application of the set-off as intended by the legislator in section 20.  
It seems quite unfortunate that counsel for Megs Investments did not follow 
this argument as opposed to the arguments submitted. This could well have 
forced the SCA to interpret section 20 in this context and give more clarity on 
the matter. Such clarity could have made the issue of In 33 in 2010 
unnecessary but in the absence of such clarity, my view is that an 
amendment to section 20 is required to clear up the confusion. 
Please note that the SCA did not err in their decision to not give a verdict on 
this matter, it was just not necessitated by the arguments submitted by 
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In summary, I highlight the anomalies existing in each of the cases discussed 
above: 
• Louis Zinn – There appears to be uncertainty in current legislation and 
case law as to whether there should be a clear distinction between the 
two phrases balance of assessed loss and assessed loss. This 
type of uncertainty can lead to confusion in all courts where two 
parties take a different view on this matter and use this particular court 
case as a precedent. The SCA would be bound to the stare decices 
principle and would not be able to ignore the Louis Zinn case. A judge 
could however interpret the phrase balance of assessed loss in a 
specific scenario as being very different to an assessed loss as 
intended by the legislator. This is an undesirable situation and needs 
some urgent clarity. A possible remedy for this anomaly is for both of 
these phrases to be clearly defined in either section 1 or section 20 of 
the ITA. 
 
• Datakor – The anomaly that remains in the current legislation and 
case law, even after the introduction of section 19 of the ITA, is the 
basis of how the critical element of valuation of a benefit is not dealt 
with in such a case. In this regard, the TAA was introduced and made 
effective from 1 October 2012. Chapter 9 of this Act deals with dispute 
resolution and taxpayers should take due care to comply with this Act 
when dealing with any disputes, objections, appeals and the 
establishment of the burden of proof. Interesting to note is that in ITC 
178523 24, the court decided in favour of the taxpayer in the 
circumstances where SARS issued revised assessments and as part 
of the dispute process against these revised assessments, the 
taxpayer discovered a mistake on their tax return in their favour. The 
court held that the taxpayer may object to their own omission as part 
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of the dispute against the revised assessments issued by SARS. This 
gives further emphasis to the due care a taxpayer should take when 
issuing any documentation to SARS, including tax returns and 
objections. It is understood that the introduction of the TAA will clarify 
and emphasise a lot of these practical anomalies, but the fact that 
these practical matters are included in a completely separate act to 
the relevant tax act is not ideal. 
 
• Conshu - One can understand the intention of the legislator to design 
an anti-avoidance provision in the ITA, like section 103(2) with a 
scope as wide as possible to be able to achieve its purpose and 
address the tax avoidance contemplated. The problem with the use of 
the  word any, read together with the word such, is that the scope of 
a phrase containing these words is determined with reference to 
limiting effect of the word such and that the word any do not increase 
the scope at all. Its only effect is to increase the possible application of 
an item included in the determined scope. The anomaly in this case 
therefore exist in the verdict of Harms JA, using the word any to 
scope in an assessed loss as determined in a subsequent tax year 
into the application of section 103(2), without giving cognisance to the 
limitation imposed by the word such. The word such in this case 
refers to assessed losses utilised solely or mainly for the purpose of 
avoiding the payment of any tax. Inherently this section is limited to a 
balance of assessed loss or assessed loss which was in existence 
at the time the agreement was entered into or effected and does not 
include all future determined assessed losses. The fact that a balance 
of assessed loss is not defined in the ITA and that the definition of an 
assessed loss in section 20 is very vague in defining its practical 
existence, is problematic and creates the opportunity for different 
interpretations. Harms JA seems to have used this opportunity to 
come to a result in this case which was his best interpretation of the 
intention of the legislator and an equitable result. The possible remedy 
for anomaly is to have clear definitions of these two phrases in section 





existence of an assessed loss as embodied in the TAA into the ITA in 
order to bridge the gap between the theory of an assessed loss and 
its application in practice. 
 
• ITC 1830 – The nature and the enforceability of IN 33 issued by SARS 
is problematic and creates uncertainty amongst taxpayers when 
looking to arrange their affairs in a legal and tax efficient manner. The 
anomaly exists in the contradiction between the view taken on the 
income from trade requirement by the designers of IN 33 and the 
designers of section 20 (2A) of the ITA. This subsection of the Act 
inherently includes an implication that the relief this section grants to 
any taxpayer other than a company, does not apply to companies 
themself. The lack of clarity was increased by SARS issuing the In 33 
in 2010. The remedy to clear out the confusion is possibly for a 
subparagraph in section 20 to deal with company taxpayers 
specifically, incorporating the current view from SARS included in the 
IN 33 into the ITA. 
 
• Megs Investments – The income from trade requirement for a 
company taxpayer came to the fore again in this case, but in a slightly 
different context. This case was heard before the issue of IN 33 and 
probably was part of the reason why SARS was inclined to issue IN 
33. This case clearly proved that the income from trade requirement 
was possibly drafted and interpreted in a too narrow way, specifically 
where a company taxpayer, with various assets found itself in a 
transitional phase between operating and two different businesses 
and not earning income from its new trading venture. On the 
assumption that SARS will strictly apply their view documented IN 33, 
a taxpayer in this or a similar situation would have some, but not 
sufficient comfort to be able to determine with great certainty what the 






The anomalies and uncertainties discussed above lead to the question as to 
whether such anomalies provide enough grounds to put forward a proposal 
for section 20 to be redrafted, specifically the words highlighted in bold 
above? Or perhaps, should there be a consideration of the merit to redraft 
the whole ITA? 
In order to answer these two questions, and more specifically the second 
question, I investigate and discuss two more critical sections of the ITA. 
Firstly, the dividend definition as included in section 1 of the ITA has been 
notorious for numerous changes since 1964. These include changes for this 
definition to be adjusted in line with IFRS requirements as well as a further 
significant revamp and simplification of this section in 2012. A completely 
new ITA could possibly get rid of the legacy of the changes in the ITA of 
1962 and the case law giving guidance as to how the court should interpret 
the anomalies which exists at the time. 
Secondly, I compare the drafting of the anti-avoidance provisions included in 
section 7 of the ITA to the similar anti-avoidance provisions included in the 
8th Schedule to the ITA. For this purpose I compare section 7(5) with 
paragraph 71 of the Eight Schedule. Paragraph 71 contains phrases like for 
example ‘confers a right’ and ‘power of revocation’ which is not included in 
section 7. The issue is the fact that these two sections of the ITA are 
designed to achieve the same result, yet are distinctly different in the drafting 
of their respective wording and could lead to differing interpretations. A 
revised ITA, incorporating the content of the 10 Schedules in the body of the 
Act will possibly solve this issue. 
Based on the above, my answer to the questions will have to be in the 
affirmative. The legislator found it necessary to redraft the Companies Act 
No. 71 of 2008 after the previous Companies Act was in existence for 35 
years. A revision of the ITA after 52 years would not be out of line with the 
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